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1. Introduction 
This report will give an overview of a rather complex and complicated subject 
matter. It deals with the question of importance of future peace operations, the 
socio-economic effects of the “third generation” of peacekeeping. These mis-
sions usually also involve aspects of peacebuilding. Beyond eliminating the use 
of violence and/or maintaining peace, operations try to establish the rule of law, 
improve governance in the area of operation and promote reconciliation so that 
armed conflict is no longer considered to be a mechanism for dispute resolution. 
But these integrated peacekeeping operations (PKOs) also have broader 
objectives, like those related to economic development, which, in particular, 
should benefit the local population. 
The analysis will concentrate on United Nations-led missions, mandated by 
the Security Council. These operations have been studied more closely than the 
missions led by NATO, the European Union or the African Union. 
2. The Background of Peacekeeping Operations 
The origins of these ideas go back to the early 1990s. When Boutros Boutros-
Ghali became UN Secretary-General in 1992, he published the seminal Agenda 
for Peace, in which he added to the Security Council’s notions of “preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping” his own concept of “post-conflict 
peacebuilding”, an important element for the promotion of “sustainable 
economic and social development.”1 He defined peacebuilding as an “action to 
identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace 
in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”2 Boutros Boutros-Ghali also initiated in 
                                            
1 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. An Agenda for Peace. Preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping. Report pursuant to the statement adopted by 
the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277–S/24111, 17 
June 1992, par. 5. 
2 Ibid. par. 55. In par. 55 Boutros-Ghali included in peacebuilding “disarming the previously 
warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of 
weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, 
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1992 a reorganisation of the whole peacekeeping structure of the United 
Nations. One of his first decisions was to establish the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN Secretariat in New York.3 
In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, published in 1995, Boutros-Ghali 
admitted that the implementation of post-conflict peacebuilding can be 
“complicated.” It would require “integrated action” as well as “delicate dealings 
between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict” in respect of which 
peacebuilding activities are to be undertaken.4 
It was against the background of the failures of the UN Peace Operations in 
Rwanda, and particularly the peace-enforcement operations in Somalia and 
Bosnia, that new, more comprehensive peace operations were established. One 
of the first of these operations was UNTAES (United Nations Transitional 
Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium), established 
by a Security Council mandate in early 1996.5 In its mandate, the civilian 
element of UNTAES was tasked with the “assistance in the coordination of 
plans for the development and economic reconstruction of the region.”6 Other 
complex integrated peacebuilding missions, established in the mid to late 
1990s, were operations in Bosnia, Guatemala, Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, 
Kosovo and DR Congo.7 Resolution 1031 (1995) of the Security Council author-
ised NATO to establish a multinational implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia. 
The mandate only indirectly referred to economic reconstruction in citing Annex 
10 of the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement. 
                                                                                                                                
monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening 
governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political 
participation.” 
3 Cf. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/dpko.shtml. 
4 United Nations. Secretary-General. Supplement To An Agenda for Peace. Position Paper 
on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. A/50/60–S/1995/1, 
3 January 1995, par. 48. 
5 Cf. Smoljan, Jelena. Socio-economic Aspects of Peacebuilding: UNTAES and the 
Organization of Employment in Eastern Slavonia. In: International Peacekeeping, Vol. 10, 
No. 2 (Summer 2003). 27–50 (31). 
6 S/RES/1037 (1996), 15 January 1996. 
7 Cf. Table 1.1 in Paris, Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk. Introduction. Understanding the 
contradictions of postwar statebuilding. In: Roland Paris/Timothy D. Sisk (eds.). The 
Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Confronting the contradictions of postwar peace operations, 
London–New York: Routledge, 2009. 2. 
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Resolution 1244 (1999) of the Security Council granted the NATO-led KFOR 
(Kosovo Force) authority to establish a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charta. It required that the United Nations exercise 
the sovereign prerogatives of a state for the first time.8 It authorised UNMIK (UN 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) to establish an interim civilian 
administration under which the people could progressively enjoy substantial 
autonomy. The Resolution had little to say about socio-economic rebuilding, 
only in paragraph 11 did it assign UNMIK the responsibility for “supporting the 
reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction.” 
Still, the mandate was unprecedented in its scope and complexity. One of 
the lessons learned by UNMIK in relation to socio-economic effects was 
expressed by Michael J. Dziedzic: 
Peace must pay so the coalition for peace can prevail. Peace is a political agenda, 
and as with any political agenda, local political leaders must be willing to carry it 
forward. Elites willing to take risks for peace and their supporters must benefit from 
the peace process if their backing is to be maintained. Ensuring tangible 
improvement in the quality of life by expeditiously restoring basic public services 
should be a top priority. Peace has to pay for all the parties to the conflict, 
moreover, if they are to develop a stake in sustaining peace.9 
The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi 
Report), published in 2000 and a reaction to the rather mixed results of the 
peace operations in the 1990s, defined peacebuilding as activities which 
“reassemble the foundations of peace” to build something that is “more than just 
the absence of war.” Among its activities the report included:  reintegrating of 
former combatants into civilian society; strengthening the rule of law; improving 
respect for human rights; technical assistance for democratic development; 
conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques; support for the fight against 
corruption; demining programs; and action against infectious diseases.10 
The to a certain extent disappointing World Summit in New York, 14 to 16 
September 2005, had as its most important outcome the establishment of a 
Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body. The Summit 
                                            
8 Cf. Dziedzic, Michael J.  Kosovo. In: Durch, William J. (ed.). Twenty-First-Century Peace 
Operations, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006. 319–388 (334). 
9 Ibid. 380. 
10 Cf. United Nations. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305–
S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, par. 13/14. 
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acknowledged in this connection the need for a “coordinated, coherent and 
integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding,” with a view to achieve 
“sustainable peace,” which should lay the foundation for “sustainable 
development.”11 
In 2007, the Department of Field Support (DFS) was created by the new UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, intended to assist in carrying out the 
increasingly complex tasks of peace operations. It oversees daily field support 
operations in the areas of personnel, finance, information and communication 
technology, and logistics necessary to mount, direct, and sustain United 
Nations’ field-based peace operations world-wide.12 Both the DPKO and the 
DFS use integrated and shared capacities. 
Together the DPKO and the new DFS published the so-called Capstone 
Doctrine in 2008. This internal DPKO/DFS paper sits at the “highest level” of the 
doctrine framework for UN peacekeeping. All subordinate directives and 
guidelines issued by DPKO/DFS should “conform to the principles and con-
cepts” referred to in this document.13 
According to the Doctrine, the changes in international politics have given 
rise to a new generation of “multi-dimensional” UN peacekeeping operations. 
They are often deployed in the aftermath of a violent internal conflict and usually 
employ military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of 
a comprehensive peace agreement.14 Table 1 on page 7 gives a list of tasks for 
this kind of peacekeeping operation. Besides the peacekeepers in the narrow 
sense, the tasks are tackled by an array of actors, as for example the UN family, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, NGOs, the Red Cross etc.  
                                            
11 United Nations. General Assembly. 2005 World Summit Outcome. Sixtieth session, 
Resolution 60/1, 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1, par. 97. 
12 Cf. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/dfs.shtml. 
13 United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support. 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. New York: 2008. 9. 
14 Cf. ibid. 22. 
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Table 1 
The Core Business of Multidimensional United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: 
Indicative Post-Conflict Tasks 
Infrastructure 
Employment 
Economic governance 
Civil administration 
Elections 
Political process 
Security operations 
Disarmament, demobilisation 
and reintegration (DDR) 
Rule of law 
Human rights 
Capacity building 
Humanitarian assistance 
 
Source: United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field 
Support. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines, New 
York: 2008. 23. 
For the Doctrine, “[s]ocio-economic recovery and development is critical to 
the achievement of a lasting peace.” Multidimensional United Nations peace-
keeping operations are “rarely mandated to play a direct role in the promotion of 
socio-economic recovery and development.” Therefore, the multidimensional 
United Nations peacekeeping operations play a “more limited supporting role”. 
Nevertheless, United Nations peacekeeping operations may “assist” the work of 
development partners.15 In addition, such peacekeeping operations often 
implement Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). The Capstone Doctrine describes 
QIPs the following way: 
[They] are small-scale projects, designed to benefit the population. QIPs may take 
a number of forms, including infrastructure assistance or short-term employment 
                                            
15 Cf. ibid. 29. 
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generation activities. QIPs establish and build confidence in the mission, its 
mandate and the peace process.16 
In this context, the Doctrine warns against “conflating” politico-military 
activities with humanitarian operations. Humanitarian actors could have con-
cerns that QIPs or Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) projects are regarded as 
being of a humanitarian nature, when they see these as “primarily serving 
political, security or reconstruction priorities”.17 
For the Doctrine, UN peacekeeping operations function through a mix of 
civilian contracted services procured by the UN and military support capabilities, 
which are provided through “lease” arrangements between the UN and 
contributing Member States.18 Usually, contingents arrive with supplies for 30 to 
90 days to maintain self-sufficiency. During that period, the UN enters into 
service contracts to provide the bulk supplies of a mission, such as water, 
rations, laundry, waste disposal and some transport services. Contingents 
bringing their own equipment are paid for the lease of this equipment by the 
United Nations, based on agreed reimbursement rates.19 
According to the Capstone Doctrine, the activities of a multidimensional UN 
peacekeeping operation should support and, where necessary, build national 
capacity. Any “displacement of national or local capacity should be avoided” 
wherever possible.20 Another concern of the Doctrine is the (perceived) impact 
of the UN operation’s “human and material footprint.” Besides social (such as 
different cultural norms) and environmental impacts (for example, waste 
management or water usage), it stresses the possible “major impact on the host 
economy.” Peacekeeping operations could push up the price of local housing 
and accommodation, or place demands on local producers for staple foods and 
materials, thus placing such items out of reach of the local community. These 
effects could “have the potential for creating friction and discontent within the 
                                            
16 Ibid. 30. 
17 Ibid. 30. Here the abbreviation “CIMIC” stands for “Civil Military Coordination”, on p. 94 it 
stands for  “Civil-Military Cooperation”. 
18 Cf. ibid. 77. 
19 Cf. ibid. 91 and footnote 7. 
20 Ibid. 40. 
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local population” and should be “continuously monitored and managed by the 
mission’s leadership.”21 
At the invitation of the Security Council, the Report of the Secretary-General 
on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict from June 2009 
considered “how to support national efforts in affected countries to secure a 
sustainable peace more rapidly and effectively.”22 Experience and analysis 
accumulated over the last two decades, as well as numerous interviews 
conducted with national and international practitioners for the preparation of the 
Report, pointed to several recurring areas where international assistance has 
been frequently requested as a priority in the immediate aftermath of conflict. 
The Report mentions five areas in this regard: support for basic safety and 
security; support for the political process (including elections); provision of basic 
services and the safe return of refugees; restoring core government functions. 
The fifth point includes: 
Support to economic revitalization, including employment generation and liveli-
hoods (in agriculture and public works) particularly for youth and demobilized 
former combatants, as well as rehabilitation of basic infrastructure.23 
The Report adds that “[j]ump-starting economic recovery can be one of the 
greatest bolsters of security, and provides the engine for future recovery.”24 One 
of the greatest challenges, according to the Report, is to ensure that “actions or 
decisions taken in the short term do not prejudice medium and long-term 
peacebuilding.”25 There is no single template that can be applied to the complex 
situations of peacebuilding; maintaining “flexibility and adaptability are 
essential.”26 In the final instance, it is largely “the leaders on the ground, both 
national and international, who can ensure that vision, strategy and decision-
making respond effectively to the realities of an ever-changing situation.”27 
                                            
21 Ibid. 81-82. 
22 Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, 
General Assembly/Security Council, A/63/881–S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, par. 1. 
23 Ibid. par.17; also par. 58. 
24 Ibid. par.18. 
25 Ibid. par. 20. 
26 Ibid. par. 22. 
27 Ibid. par. 89. 
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Table 2 
Cost for UN Field Operations 
US$ Million, 2008/2009 
Other civilian (government provided, 
electoral observers, consultants) 7.4 
Quick impact projects 10.8 
Special equipment 30.1 
Official travel 32.8 
Naval transportation 81.2 
Medical 83.9 
Other supplies, services and 
equipment 
176.6 
Ground transportation 187.7 
Communications and information 
technology 289.5 
Air transportation 867.5 
Facilities and infrastructure 959.8 
Civilian personnel 1341.8 
Military & police personnel 2829.3 
 
Note: Figures based on approved 1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009 resources for peace-
keeping operations;  not included: support to African Union Mission in Somalia. 
Source: United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field 
Support. A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. 
New York, July 2009. 29. 
In the 2009 New Horizon Non-Paper of DPKO and DFS the two Depart-
ments aim to strengthen UN peacekeeping for tomorrow. The budget of UN 
peacekeeping has “soared to nearly $7.8 billion a year,” over 116,000 persons 
are deployed across 15 missions.28 Table 2 shows the different cost elements 
of UN field operations for 2008/2009. 
                                            
28 United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support. A 
New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. New York, July 
2009. 2. 
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In addition, Table 3 displays the scope and magnitude UN field operations 
have. The large number of procurement transactions is of particular interest for 
the further discussion here. 
Table 3 
UN Peacekeeping: Support Facts and Figures 
UN aircraft in peacekeeping missions 270 
UN vehicles in peacekeeping missions 17,350 
Cost of daily fuel consumption $1.75 million 
Daily water provision 11 million liters 
Daily power generated 300 million watts 
Number of peacekeeping procurement 
transactions in 2008 17,387 
Value of peacekeeping procurement 
transactions in 2008 $1.43 billion 
 
Source: United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field 
Support. A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. 
New York, July 2009. 35. 
Both Departments underline again the immediate peacebuilding priorities of 
the Secretary-General’s Report in their New Horizon Non-Paper but admit that 
UN peacekeeping “is not well equipped to tackle the social and economic 
dimensions of peacebuilding;” the UN relies on others to provide sustainable 
development and capacity-building support.29 
The Global Field Support Strategy announced in the Non-Paper was pub-
lished in January 2010 in a Report of the Secretary-General. The Strategy 
explains that each peacekeeping mission mandate is unique and therefore, 
each support delivery mechanisms have to be invented anew: 
[A]n on-the-ground assessment must be conducted and a budget prepared in 
accordance with the Security Council mandate. A fully justified staffing table must 
be devised and the critical and necessary equipment identified, prepared, inspected 
and transported to the mission areas. Appropriate memorandums of understanding 
                                            
29 Cf. ibid. 23. 
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and letters of assist must be negotiated, and forces must be identified, prepared 
and deployed. Land for housing and mission operations must be secured and 
improved, contracts for every product and every service, from gravel to aircraft 
operations, must be negotiated. International staff must be attracted and recruited, 
and local staff must be identified and hired. For these reasons, the process of 
planning, mounting and deploying a new operation can take, on average, from 6 to 
12 months.30 
The new Strategy wants to change the provisions for support to the field 
missions, aiming to deliver timely, high-quality integrated services to missions. It 
foresees a reinforced division of labor and the relocation of functions: The 
Secretariat in New York (i.e. the DFS) will continue to set the strategic direction, 
exercise oversight and take policy decisions. Global and regional service 
centres will undertake operational and transactional functions; the regional 
centres will also integrate support teams from various missions to support a 
region. Location-dependent activities will continue to be performed in-mission 
(i.e. at the location of the mission); they include activities, such as cash man-
agement and equipment support services.31 This “global approach” will “simplify 
systems, avoid duplication with field operations, ensure consistency in best 
practices, prioritise efforts in areas of critical importance and achieve economies 
of scale in resourcing requirements.”32 At the end of July 2010, senior officials 
announced that the General Assembly “was poised to approve” the new 
Strategy to match the global enterprise into which peacekeeping has evolved.33 
3. The Socio-economic Effects of Peace Operations 
In multidimensional peace operations, the military contingents will be the first on 
the ground in an often war-torn country. In this early phase of the mission, these 
troops are practically the only element which possesses the necessary 
resources for a rapid and speedy socio-economic improvement of the situation 
on the ground. Since the military has rather extensive requirements for per-
                                            
30 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. Global field support strategy. United 
Nations General Assembly, A/64/633, 26 January 2010, par. 10. 
31 Cf. ibid. par. 18, 22, 23. 
32 Ibid. par. 37. 
33 Press Conference on the Secretary-General’s Global Field Support Strategy, United 
Nations Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, New York, 30 July 
2010 [http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100730_Malcorra.doc.htm]. 
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sonnel and material supplies, it can be in a way an “early market” for local staff 
and providers of goods. Economic incentives for the local society may not only 
increase the trust of the locals in the mission, in addition they also could serve 
as force protection for the military. Moreover, the military can also provide 
resources for improving the local situation, for example, through building up or 
upgrading the (damaged) infrastructure. These activities have to be linked to the 
needs of the local population by creating networks among the relevant actors. 
Finally, the actions ought to be “trailblazers” for a sustainable socio-economic 
development. 
After these general remarks on the possible (positive) effects of multidi-
mensional peace operations, four issues will now be discussed in greater detail: 
the overall impact of operations, the impact on the price level, on the labor 
market and on procurement. 
3.1. The Overall Socio-economic Impact 
In the New Horizon Non-Paper mentioned above, the authors stress that 
UN peacekeepers play a critical role in building peace after conflict, in establishing 
the conditions for recovery and development activities, and in carrying out some of 
the tasks essential to stabilization and early consolidation of peace.34 
In modern peacekeeping operations the first task of peacekeepers (i.e. the 
troops on the ground) is to create a stable and secure environment in an area 
that has often been devastated by war. The establishment of peace and security 
is a pre-condition for the population to begin with (legal) economic activities. 
However, beyond this most important indirect contribution of peacekeeping to a 
nation’s economic recovery, there are also direct economic effects: 
[T]he way in which the peace and security are provided can either enhance or 
detract from that level of development and from the sustainibility of peace and 
stability. Mission structure, procurement decisions, hiring decisions, and decisions 
by staff on how to spend their mission subsistence allowances (MSA) all influence 
                                            
34 United Nations. Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support. A 
New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping. New York, July 
2009. 22. 
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an operation’s “economic footprint”[emphasis added], that is its impact on the local 
economy.35 
The expenses of the participants in peacekeeping operations has a rather 
high potential: if well applied, it can “kick-start” a local economy at a time when 
this is most needed and therefore assist in the restoration of peace and stability. 
The overall assumption of this comprehensive study is “that United Nations 
missions do more good and less damage, in economic terms, than is commonly 
believed.”36 There is an “immediate upsurge” in economic activity and the 
expenditures of the UN missions provide “a stimulus to the local economy.”37 
It is not easy to calculate what peacekeeping operations actually spend at a 
theatre of operations. According to William Durch, the three main categories of 
local expenses by peacekeeping missions are: 
(1) living allowances distributed in cash for UN staff and experts, the Mis-
sion Subsistence Allowance (MSA); for UN Volunteers the Volunteer 
Living Allowance (VLA); 
(2) the salaries of locally-hired mission staff (the “national staff”); 
(3) the local content of mission procurement (goods and services originating 
in the state hosting the mission).38 
These are actually “incidental cash injections” that peacekeeping operations 
give the local economy by deploying and performing their job. They are not 
intended as development efforts.39 Across the nine missions analysed by 
Carnahan et al., the spending of allowances had the largest impact on the local 
economy. It represented over half of the impact in four missions and between 40 
                                            
35 Carnahan, Michael, William Durch, and Scott Gilmore. Economic Impact of Peacekeeping. 
Final Report, New York–Ottawa: Peace Dividend Trust, March 2006. 11. This paper is the 
most important empirical study on the economic effects of peacekeeping. 
36 Ibid.1. 
37 Ibid. 51. 
38 Cf. Durch, William. The Economic Impact of Peacekeeping: An Update. In: Feichtinger, 
Walter, Markus Gauster, and Fred Tanner (eds.). Economic Impacts of Crisis Response 
Operations. An Underestimated Factor in External Engagement. Vienna–Geneva: 
Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, April 2010 (= Schriftenreihe der 
Landesverteidigungsakademie, 5/2010/S, in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for 
Security Policy (GCSP)). 157–189 (158). Not included are the salaries (even the living 
allowances per diem) of the international staff, which usually are not spent in the aera of 
operation, as well as the procurement of imported goods and services. 
39 Cf. ibid. 158. 
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and 50 percent in four others. The local content of procurement provided the 
second largest overall impact. In four of the missions it contributed over 40 
percent of the total. National staff salaries had the lowest impact, although in 
four missions national salaries exceeded 20 percent of the missions’ total local 
impact.40 Overall, the local impact (including the Keynesian multiplier effect 
calculated by Carnahan et al.) of the peacekeeping missions was rather large in 
some missions: In two out of the nine missions it constituted around 10 percent 
of GDP; in two other peacekeeping missions it was slightly more than 6 percent; 
in the rest it was below 4 percent.41 Thus, a “significant economic boost is 
provided at a time when the economy needs it most.”42 A later study tried to 
estimate the amount of money contributed to the host states’ economy by eight 
UN operations during four fiscal years (2004/5–2007/8); the estimates range 
from $1.5 to $1.8 billion.43 
3.2. The Impact on the Price Level 
One unintended consequence of these “cash injections” is the possible rise in 
prices for goods and services, in short, inflation. Carnahan et al. maintain that 
the “perception of widespread inflation is not borne out”, price rises that occur 
are only found “in small pockets of the economy servicing internationals.”44 The 
update published four years later gives similar results.45 An account of the 
UNAMET/UNTAET mission in East Timor showed that the inflation in East 
Timor was lower in 2000 than in 1998, before the deployment of the UN mis-
sions. Still, there was inflation for consumer goods purchased by members of 
the UN mission; but this did not cause a permanent increase of the inflation rate 
in East Timor.46 Looking at other case studies, this relatively “benign” effect of 
                                            
40 Cf. Carnahan et al. (2006:16). 
41 Cf. ibid. 15. 
42 Ibid. 17. 
43 Cf. Durch (2010:169). 
44 Carnahan et al. (2006:51). 
45 Cf. Durch (2010:169). 
46 Cf. Krawinkler, Franz. Sozioökonomische Auswirkungen von integrierten multi-
dimensionalen Friedensoperationen (FEOs) der Vereinten Nationen (VN) in und auf 
Gastgeberländer. Wie könnte eine erfolgreiche Umsetzung der VN Grundlagen in VN FEOs 
unterstützt werden? Studie zur Erlangung des Dienstgrades „OberstdhmfD“, Wien, 22. Juli 
2010. 23. 
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the peacekeepers’ local spending was not so obvious. A study of Kosovo states 
that the international presence has led to increased prices for goods and 
services for nationals, taking “prices beyond the reach of the local 
populations.”47 
3.3. The Impact on the Labour Market 
The effects of hiring local (national) staff on the labour market of the mission 
area is widely debated. Some argue that the hiring of national staff would be the 
“quickest and most effective way to inject much needed funds into the local 
economy”. Others claim that the peacekeeping missions “hired the best 
administrative staff at rates that the national government and the private sector 
could not compete with.”48 
A more detailed analysis found that employing national staff caused obvious 
savings in the peacekeeping mission budget, since international staff would cost 
four to five times (Kosovo) or even between ten and fifty times (Afghanistan) 
more per month.49 Thus, cleaning staff, drivers, interpreters, technicians und 
administrative support staff are usually hired among the local populations.50 
Skills acquired through working with the international organisation, as well as on 
the job training, formal schooling and mentoring from their colleagues could 
have a positive medium and long-term impact on the local and national 
economy: a rise in productivity and, as a result, an internationally more 
competitive economy. This could be realised through subsequent employment 
outside the mission structure and even through the provision of cash flow for 
investment in small business ventures. Employing national staff would moreover 
“enhance the legitimacy” of peacekeeping missions.51 
                                            
47 Ammitzboell, Katarina. Unintended consequences of peace operations on the host 
economy from a people's perspective. In: Chiyuki Aoi/Cedric de Coning/Ramesh Thakur 
(eds.). Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations. Tokyo – New York – Paris: 
United Nations University Press, 2007. 69–89 (84). 
48 Carnahan et al. (2006:29). 
49 Ammitzboell (2007:76-77). 
50 Cf. Krawinkler (2010 :26). 
51 Carnahan et al.(2006:31). 
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Negative unintended effects could be a “brain drain” of the highly qualified 
employees from national or local jobs.52 The much higher wage scales of UN 
missions not only influence local employment, but also the development 
agencies and NGOs operating in the area.53 In Kosovo, higher wages resulted 
in price rises for standard commodities, forcing locals to take more than one job 
to be able to support their family.54 An author even goes further and maintains 
the “detrimental impact of international salaries on a poor local population” in 
Kosovo which “encourages corruption.”In addition and to make matters worse, 
this trap “proved impossible to evade.”55 
An additional problem related to the different employment opportunities is 
the “dual public sector syndrome.” In Kosovo and Afghanistan public sector 
assistance and services are provided both by the national government and the 
UN mission and other international groups.56 
3.4. Local Procurement 
As already mentioned, local content of procurement has the second largest 
overall impact on the local economy. Table 3 on page 11 showed the large num-
ber of peacekeeping procurement transactions taking place each year. Every 
peacekeeping mission needs accommodation facilities, office space, 
transportation and communication facilities, computer systems and a range of 
consumable goods, from oil to paper to bottled water. 
The use of local office space and housing options, as opposed to purpose-
built UN compounds, can provide a significant stimulus for economic recovery.57 
It has a significant impact on the development of the construction and 
                                            
52 Cf. Krawinkler (2010 :27). 
53 Cf. Carnahan et al.(2006 :34). 
54 Ammitzboell (2007:77-78). 
55 Mappes-Niedieck, Norbert. A Case Study of Kosovo. In: Feichtinger, Walter et al. (eds.). 
Economic Impacts of Crisis Response Operations. An Underestimated Factor in External 
Engagement. Vienna–Geneva: Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung und Sport, April 
2010 (= Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 5/2010/S, in cooperation with the 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)). 192–200 (194-195). 
56 Cf. Ammitzboell (2007:79). 
57 Cf. Carnahan et al.(2006:48). The authors add that mission leadership must take into 
account the security considerations before encouraging staff use of local housing. 
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contracting industries, generating both business income and jobs. Employment 
in this sector also brings workers into the formal labor force. Since businesses in 
this sector usually have to be registered and have to comply with government 
regulations, construction and contracting will drag them out of the informal 
economy, thus generating tax revenues for the government.58 
Basically, contracting for goods and services for missions can be done 
locally or from headquarters. In addition, local procurement can also be man-
aged by troop contributing countries (TCCs). In EU-led missions, many pro-
curement activities have to be organised by the TCCs. An analysis of the pro-
curement by the Austrian contingent of the EUFOR Tchad/RCA Mission showed 
that it spent almost € 1 million between March 2008 and December 2009  for 
local procurement with some 190 local businesses. The amounts of money 
spent went from €1,52 on the local market in Arbéché (Chad) to one transaction 
of €175,000.59 The experience of the Austrian contingent shows that even small 
sums can help to stimulate the local economy. The trick is to identify the 
potential of the local situation and to communicate with the other actors (TCCs, 
NGOs etc.) on the ground. 
The UN Procurement Manual establishes the “Best Value for Money” prin-
ciple, but “price alone is not necessarily determinative” for this principle.60 
Therefore, it should provide sufficient flexibility for missions to increase local 
procurement.61 Some resolutions by the General Assembly outline the princi-
ples governing outsourcing decisions.62 
There exists a tendency towards centralisation of global procurement, since 
there seem to be possible savings through managing procurement from 
headquarters. Some ambiguity can be clearly observed in the Global Field 
Support Strategy mentioned above. The Strategy states that the typical envi-
ronment of a peacekeeping mission today “is remote, austere and, increasingly, 
                                            
58 Cf. Carnahan et al.(2006 :25). 
59 I want to thank Thomas Truong from the Austrian Ministry of Defence for providing me with 
information on EUFOR Tchad/RCA. 
60 United Nations. Department of Management, Office of Central Support Services, 
Procurement Division. Procurement Manual. Revision 6, March 2010, Chapter 1, point 1.2. 
61 Cf. Carnahan et al.(2006 :26). 
62 Cf. e.g. United Nations. General Assembly. Resolution on Outsourcing Practices. 
A/RES/55/232, 6 February 2001. But this resolution warns about too much outsourcing. 
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dangerous” as well as “[l]ocal markets for goods and services are limited or non-
existent.”63 Global and regional service centres should be established, “only 
location-dependent activities [would be] performed in specific mission locations.” 
On the other hand, mission impact objectives should also be to “[f]ully utilize 
local and regional investment and capacity.”64 In addition, the system of 
contingent-owned equipment (COE) brings more responsibility for the TCCs in 
procurement transactions. 
Again, as in all activities in war-torn areas, a skill (by of the UN or the TCCs) 
is needed to balance the requirements of a mission against the socio-economic 
development of the host country. 
3.5. Preliminary Conclusions 
The points debated above show that any analysis of the socio-economic impact 
of peacekeeping operations has to deal with a rather complex reality. One has 
to start with the background to PKOs, i.e. the economic situation during the 
war/military operations, the so-called conflict economiy. The latter often includes 
a shadow economy, which reduces formal economic activities and leads to the 
growth of an informal sector. 
                                            
63 United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. Global field support strategy. United 
Nations General Assembly, A/64/633, 26 January 2010. 1. 
64 Ibid. 3. 
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Figure 1 
Improvement of the Socio-economic Impact of Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO) 
 
Source: Own compilation of topics in Gauster, Markus, and Markus Maruszczak. The 
Underestimated Relevance of Economic Impacts of Crisis Response Operations. in: 
Walter Feichtinger et al. (eds.). Economic Impacts of Crisis Response Operations. An 
Underestimated Factor in External Engagement. Vienna–Geneva: Bundesministerium 
für Landesverteidigung und Sport, April 2010 (= Schriftenreihe der Landesver-
teidigungsakademie, 5/2010/S, in cooperation with the Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy (GCSP)). 10–80. (42–48). 
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People adapt their behaviour, trying to survive and maximise the economic 
opportunities which occured due to the economic transformation brought about 
by armed conflict. The effects of these “economies” outlast a conflict and 
become a concern of peacebuilding.65 
To avoid public disappointment during the immediate post-conflict situation, 
a “priority for post-conflict economic policy is to support the creation of peace 
dividends.” Another policy priority is to create “labour and education 
opportunities”. In addition, the capacity-building for the state is important; this 
can be achieved, for example, through “the gradual co-option of the informal into 
the formal economy” by increasing the tax revenue.66 
With this background, Figure 1 on page 20 tries to introduce some of the 
complex tasks for a PKO when attempting to increase its intended positive 
impacts on the country it operates in. Two of such significant responsibilities 
concern procurement and the hiring of local people (nationals). The final goal of 
every PKO must be the self-sustainability of a country’s socio-economic 
development. 
4. Questions for Future Peacekeeping Operations 
There will be no magic wand to make PKOs take care effectively of all the 
problems related to their socio-economic effects. Each operation will have to 
find ways for improving the situation of the local population after ending the 
military conflict and during the establishment of a stable and secure environ-
ment. 
Here follows a (partial) list of questions, the answers to which have to be 
found for each PKO, individually. 
                                            
65 Cf. Wennmann, Achim. Conflict Economies. In: Chetail, Vincent (ed.). Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding. A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 74–91 (76). 
66 Wennmann (2009: 84). 
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4.1. What Is the Local Situation? 
Before a decision is made on whether to launch a PKO, a thorough (strategic) 
assessment of the theater of operation (the host country) has to be made. This 
must also include the evaluation of the socio-economic situation and an 
estimation of possibilities for local procurement, hiring of nationals etc. 
Attention has to be paid to issues which are often not so well understood or 
taken into account, as for example: 
– cultural factors, including religion; 
– bureaucracy, acting differently from business; 
– what business opportunities exist due to the conflict economy; etc. 
4.2. How to Proceed? 
The immediate post-conflict situations are usually rather complex and difficult to 
manage. For PKOs it is the “golden hour” to improve not only the security, but 
also the socio-economic situation of the local population. In the final instance, 
coherence between peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
development is of critical importance. 
There are several general principles that have to be heeded, especially 
during the early phase of PKOs. 
Transparency 
PKOs have to act with as much transparency as possible: 
– This will help to gain trust and confidence from the population. 
– It will increase the accountability of the operation. 
– The PKO will get feedback from the beneficiaries more easily . 
– At the same time, transparency will be an disincentive for anti-social 
behaviour, like corruption and organised crime. 
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Information Exchange 
In general, the exchange of information among all participants during the 
activities in the territory is crucial for positive socio-economic effects of PKOs. 
– It should support coordination among the actors in the host country, the 
troop contributing countries, the police contributing countries, the NGOs 
and the local actors. 
– It can make the achievement of consensus on important issues among 
the actors easier. 
– In addition, establishing databases including this and other information 
would be useful, in particular regarding the quick rotation (e.g. six 
months) of the peacekeepers. 
– The Peacebuilding Commission has an overarching responsibility in this 
field. 
Civil-Military Interaction 
Exchange of information is also an element of CIMIC and the (often difficult) 
coordination of military and humanitarian agencies. In fact, civil military inter-
action is the prerequisite for the whole government or comprehensive approach 
in peacekeeping.67 
NATO defines CIMIC as “coordination and cooperation, in support of the 
mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national 
population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-
governmental organisations and agencies.” It adds that “the immediate purpose 
of CIMIC is to establish and maintain the full co-operation of the NATO 
Commander and the civilian authorities, … to allow him to fulfil his mission.”68 A 
similar definition is used by the EU, which has also developed the notion of 
                                            
67 For details see Gauster, Markus. Richtlinien und Wirkung zivil-militärischer Interaktion. 
Theorie und praktische Erfahrungen am Beispiel EUFOR Tchad/RCA. Wien: 
Landesverteidigungsakademie, Februar 2010 (= Schriftenreihe der 
Landesverteidigungsakademie, 5/2010). 13–15. 
68 Quoted from AJP-9, NATO Civil-Military Co-Operation (CIMIC) Doctrine (June, 2003), 
points 102, 103. 
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Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), differing from CIMIC in that it deals with the 
relationship between the military and civilians within the EU itself.69 
Within the UN system, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) have defined 
the relationship between military and humanitarian organisations. They have 
coined the term “CMCoord” (Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination) to 
describe the civil-military interface. Documents relating to the concept include 
the “Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) in 
Disaster Relief”, also known as the “Oslo Guidelines” (from May 1994); 
additional guidelines regulate military escorts for humanitarian convoys using 
military assets in complex emergencies.70 
As already mentioned when discussing the Capstone Doctrine, humanitarian 
organisations, in particular the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), stress the need to preserve the humanitarian space and to ensure that 
any relationship with the military is not to the detriment of the fundamental 
humanitarian principles of independence, impartiality and humanity. Since 
military actors remain the instruments of the states that send them, the 
independence and credibility of humanitarian agencies are difficult to reconcile 
with a close cooperation with the military. But there is a paradox that cannot be 
negated: while humanitarian workers may need protection from the military as 
they fulfil their missions, their association with the military may jeopardise their 
own security.71 
For coordination on the field, it would therefore not be desirable to establish 
a “centralised, hierarchical information mechanism” for peacebuilding, which 
could hamper the independence of humanitarian actors. But it is also unrealistic 
to expect a “loose network” of actors to remedy its coordination problems simply 
through information sharing. The challenge, according to Roland Paris, is to 
                                            
69 Cf. Tardy, Thierry. Civil-military Interface. In: Chetail, Vincent (ed.). Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding. A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 48–59 (50). CMCO deals 
with coordination at the politico-strategic and institutional level (inside the EU), whereas 
CIMIC relates to the tactical and operational level. See Gebhard, Carmen. Civil-Military 
Coordination and Cooperation in the Context of the EU’s Crisis Management CMCO versus 
CIMIC Conceptual and Terminological Clarifications. National Defence Academy, Institute 
for Peace Support and Conflict Management, Info Aktuell 01/2008. 
70 Cf. Tardy (2009:35–40). 
71 Cf. Tardy (2009:53). 
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“strike a balance” between preserving the flexibility of the existing loose 
networked structure and the requirement for some measure of hierarchy. What 
is needed, in short, is a “directed” network that more effectively combines 
elements of hierarchy and decentralised autonomy.72 
Capacity Building 
Another important ingredient for intended socio-economic effects of PKOs 
concerns capacity building. Individuals, groups and the government have to be 
able to again perform functions after the military conflict. According to Türk 
(2009), priorities in the immediate post-conflict environment are: reconstructing 
at least rudimentary housing and infrastructure as well as providing access to 
essential public services, such as water, sanitation, energy (in particular power 
supply), communications, transport, health, and education. These activities 
should restore some sense of normalcy and order and build confidence among 
the population.73 
These short-term measures can be also tackled through the already men-
tioned Quick Impact Projects, intended to provide fast-dispersing money for 
multiple, small projects. According to Durch, they are the only line in peace-
keeping mission budgets that can be directed to the outside of the mission to 
effect, for example, small infrastructure repairs, rather than toward direct mis-
sion needs. Their flexibility and ability to provide services for the community may 
increase or reinforce a mission’s local legitimacy.74 
                                            
72 Cf. Paris, Roland. Understanding the “coordination problem” in postwar statebuilding. In: 
Paris, Roland, and Timothy D.Sisk (eds.). The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the 
contradictions of postwar peace operations. London–New York: Routledge, 2009. 53–78 
(75). 
73 Cf. Türk, Volker. Capacity-building. In: Chetail, Vincent (ed.). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. A 
Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2009. 34–47 (42). 
74 Cf. Durch (2010:177); the author points to the fact that QIPs “are an under-evaluated tool 
whose actual value is largely unknown”. MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) 
appears to have the best-organised QIPs programme. It spent about $2 million of its 2007–
08 budget for 176 QIPs, with projects averaging $11,200 each; data from Durch, who 
quotes United Nations, Financial Performance Report of the UN Stabilization Mission in 
Haiti for the period 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2008, A/63/549, p. 46. 
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Short Term — Long Term 
These activities are clearly focused on the short-term effect. Most mandates of 
the Security Council extend only for six months. But this timespan is much too 
short for larger infrastructure projects, for instance. A case in point: Instead of 
building roads, UNTAET in East Timor rented helicopters for just six months.75 
Longer-term staffing contracts and project budgeting would enable improved 
local capacity building so that the generation of competent local staff could take 
over central competencies of the international administration.76 Peacekeepers 
must not ignore the fact that positive short-term measures can lead to long-term 
difficulties for a society. The passage from emergency assistance to 
development and sustainable peace should be the aim of PKOs.77 
Managing Expectations 
After war and destruction, PKOs usually generate high expectations among the 
local population concerning their most pressing needs. In countries emerging 
from conflict and/or at risk of violence, resource scarcities and institutional 
weaknesses will limit what can be achieved. Therefore, expectations of the local 
populations need to be managed carefully for the PKOs to maintain their 
credibility. Key actors and citizens do not judge performance on the basis of a 
mission’s performance, but on the impact of the activities on their lives. Security 
and socio-economic objectives are interrelated, and changing expectations in 
one area requires complementary actions in others.78 
                                            
75 Cf. Krawinkler (2010:35). 
76 Cf. Narten,Jens. Dilemmas of promoting “local ownership”. The case of postwar Kosovo. In: 
Paris Roland, and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.). The Dilemmas of Statebuilding. Confronting the 
contradictions of postwar peace operations. London–New York: Routledge, 2009. 252–279 
(278). 
77 Cf. Chetail, Vincent. Introduction: Post-conflict Peacebuilding — Ambiguity and Identity. In: 
Chetail, Vincent (ed.). Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. A Lexicon. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press: 2009.1–33 (8). 
78 This argument is taken from the Concept Note of the World Development Report 201. 15-
16.[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-
1256239015781/WDR_2011_Concept_Note_0207.pdf]. 
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Flexibility 
In situations where surprises are likely and quick adaptation is essential, flexi-
bility is called for. Postwar peacekeeping is an exceptionally unpredictable and 
uncertain enterprise. The missions take place in volatile environments where 
there is a relatively high likelihood of violence, compared to conditions in other 
developing states. In addition, these missions are multi-faceted and actions 
taken in one area — political, social or economic — have the potential to gen-
erate unforeseen results in other areas. Finally, peacekeepers have only limited 
knowledge of what is required to succeed in stabilising a fragile country after 
war. According to Paris (2009), the ability of peacekeepers to adapt and react 
quickly to changing circumstances and surprises — including revising specific 
strategies that are producing unforeseen and undesirable effects — is a key to 
preventing small problems from swelling into crises that threaten the peace and 
success of the mission. Therefore, rigid or overly bureaucratic forms of 
international coordination could reduce the overall effectiveness of 
peacekeeping.79 
4.3. How to Implement?80 
The analysis of the intricacies of post-conflict situations and the theoretical and 
empirical analysis of intended positive effects of PKOs leads to the question 
how PKOs have to be organised to implement these findings. 
In the context of the United Nations, it is primarily the Security Council 
through its mandates for PKOs which has to instruct and monitor the actors on 
the ground. In multidimensional peace missions, the part of the mandate that 
deals with horizontal issues, like the protection of civilians, could also include a 
short and straightforward paragraph on the activities of the operation with regard 
to its socio-economic effects. The Security Council could also ask the Secretary-
General and the Secretariat to address the issues concerning the socio-
economic effects and (intended) consequences of PKOs. A briefing by the 
Secretariat for the UN member states could be useful. Alternatively, a 
                                            
79 Cf. Paris (2009: 63). Here the author discusses postwar “statebuilding” but his remarks are 
relevant for peacekeeping operations in general. 
80 This sections draws on the very useful proposals of Krawinkler (2010:40–44). 
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recommendation, proposal or conclusion could be made by the Special Com-
mittee on Peacekeeping Operations. 
In case this is not feasible, the Concept of Operations and/or accompanying 
mission Rules of Engagement for the military component or the Directives on 
the Use of Force for the police component, respectively, could include the task 
to consider the socio-economic consequences of their duties. 
The European Union bases most of its crisis management operations on UN 
Security Council resolutions. Here the civilian aspects of crisis management and 
its promoting the broad understanding of “human security” could be the basis for 
more regard to the socio-economic effects of missions. 
Local procurement can have an important effect on the local economy. The 
United Nations Procurement Manual could be further adapted to strengthen 
local procurement. The training of contracting officers, as it is done in UN 
Member States, could help to improve the acquisition of local goods and 
services also at the UN level. 
Like the other actions suggested here, hiring national staff is essentially a 
measure based on existing structures in the host country. Qualified on-site 
candidates which cannot find a job presently could be listed in a kind of “In-
Mission Local Personnel Roster.” This Roster could be organised by the UN 
mission, being an example of an on-site knowledge management and net-
working of relevant actors. 
Quick Impact Projects could be extended to foster small businesses and 
could, in the long run, be supported by foreign donors to further enhance eco-
nomic development. Changes of the tax exempt status of UN missions are not 
realistic, but the privileges of duty free shops (“PX” stores) should be valid only 
for a limited time so that local business can grow and pay (more) taxes. 
At the operational level, the Office of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG), which directs the mission on the ground, should be 
authorised to analyse the socio-economic effects of the mission and give inputs 
to the decision-making by the SRSG; this could be done by the team of the 
Senior Economic Affairs Officer (SEAO). The SEAO, as a point of contact, 
usually tracks the local and regional economic situation; he/she could analyse 
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the direct and indirect socio-economic effects of the mission. In case of prob-
lematic developments, corrective measures could thus be implemented. 
The fundamental idea behind these suggestions is not to create (costly) new 
structures, but to use existing procedures and functions efficiently. For instance, 
practically in all armed forces there are officers who are also qualified in 
economics, like the “contracting officer”. In implementing the proposals, this 
military personnel could be trained and made aware of these tasks; these 
persons would then have the capability to advise the local commander. One 
could look for existing training arrangements in this area in TCCs and make 
sure that these facilities are properly coordinated to avoid needless duplication. 
A final issue is the evaluation and the “lessons-learned” aspect of PKOs with 
regard to their socio-economic effect. The (short-term) outcomes and the (long-
term) impacts of missions have to be the guidelines for assessing PKOs. One 
element could be the extension of results-based budgeting, also for measuring 
the achievements of missions concerning its socio-economic effects on the host 
country.81 Another possibility would be to establish an “evaluation framework” to 
reveal the complexity of peace operations and measure the different 
dimensions, also in the socio-economic field.82 
                                            
81 Cf. UN Joint Inspection Unit. Evaluation of results-based budgeting in peacekeeping 
operations. (Prepared by Even Fontaine Ortiz and Tadanori Inomata). Geneva. 
82 Cf. Diehl, Paul F., and Daniel Druckman. Evaluating Peace Operations. Boulder–London: 
Lynne Rienner, 2010. 
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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Die sogenannte „dritte Generation“ von friedenserhaltenden Operationen 
umfasst neben der Verhinderung von Gewaltanwendung auch Aktivitäten, 
welche Recht und Ordnung schaffen sowie zur wirtschaftliche Entwicklung 
beitragen sollen. Damit soll der lokalen Bevölkerung direkt geholfen werden. Die 
Vereinten Nationen haben in mehreren Dokumenten die Basis für diese 
Bemühungen niedergelegt, so etwa im „Brahimi Report“ aus 2000 und in der 
„Capstone Doctrine“ aus 2008. 
Bei den neueren, multidimensionalen Friedensoperationen werden 
militärische Einheiten weiterhin als erste Einsatzgruppe vor Ort sein. Diese 
Einheiten haben großen Bedarf an materiellen und personellen Ressourcen. Für 
ihren Einsatz müssen sie auch den Aufbau der oft erheblich beschädigten 
Infrastruktur vorantreiben. Werden diese Aktivitäten und Aufwendungen sinnvoll 
eingesetzt, können die friedenserhaltenden Operationen zur positiven sozialen 
und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im Einsatzgebiet beitragen. Nach 
grundsätzlichen Überlegungen werden in der Arbeit einerseits die vorliegenden 
Ergebnisse von empirischen Analysen diskutiert. Andererseits wird auf 
bestehende Problemlagen eingegangen, die bei zukünftigen Operationen 
berücksichtigt werden müssen. 
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